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Aherron v. St. John's Mercy Medical Center1
When an injured plaintiff brings a malpractice action against a hospital and
its employee doctor, hospital liability is normally predicated upon the theory of
respondeat superior. 2 It is generally accepted law that if the injured plaintiff sub-
sequently releases the employee doctor from all liability for the injury, then the
plaintiff may no longer maintain the lawsuit against the hospital. 3 A related, yet
unsettled, area of the lav concerns the situation where an injured plaintiff in a
malpractice action releases the employer hospital from all liability for the doctor's
negligence. In Aherron v. St. John's Mercy Medical Center,4 the Supreme
Court of Missouri was confronted with the issue of what effect this situation
has upon the ability of the injured plaintiff to mair,in his cause of action
against the employee doctor. A case of first impression in Missouri,' the
court adopted the minority position in the United States on this issue-the
release of an employer has no effect on a later cause of action against the
employee, except as to reduce the amount of damages recoverable by the
amount of the earlier settlement. 6 The Aherron case is significant because
the court refused to adhere to the common law majority position on this
issue, which provides that a release of an employer from all liability for a
tort committed by its employee also acts as a release of the employee. 7
1. Aherron v. St. John's Mercy Medical Center, 713 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1986)
(en banc).
2. See Mayfair Fabrics v. Henley, 101 N.J. Super. 363, 375, 244 A.2d 344, 352
(1968) ("In the usual case where an employer is held liable for negligent acts of an em-
ployee, the employer's liability is a vicarious one imposed under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.").
3. Max v. Spaeth, 349 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 217A (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 883, 885 (1977).
4. 713 S.W.2d 498.
5. See Max v. Spaeth, 349 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1961). This case involved an
auto accident where the plaintiff sued the driver of the other vehicle and his employer.
The plaintiff released the driver from all liability for the accident, and then attempted
to continue his suit against the employer. The court, in holding that a release of the
servant also releases the master, said in dicta that a release of the master also operates
as a release of the servant. Id. at 3.
6. Clark v. Brooks, 377 A.2d 365 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), aff'd sub nom.
Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747 (Del. 1978) (represents minority view); cf. Brown
v. City of Cambridge, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 474 (1862) (majority view).
7. For more examples of the common law position, see Hartigan v. Dickson,
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Instead, the Aherron Court adopted the minority approach which brings
about a more logical and equitable result.
This casenote will illustrate the propriety of the Aherron decision, which
protects the injured party rather than the tortfeasor. Under this approach,
an injured party is not unjustly prohibited from releasing one tortfeasor and
pursuing an action against other responsible tortfeasors for the remaining
damage. Instead, any amount obtained in the release settlement is deducted
from any future recovery by the injured party to ensure against a double
recovery.
The plaintiff, Thomas Aherron, sustained head injuries in an auto ac-
cident. He was transported to St. John's Mercy Medical Center for treatment.
At St. John's, Dr. Robert Taylor, an employee of the hospital, took head
x-rays. After diagnosing the injury as minor, Dr. Taylor sent Aherron home.,
The diagnosis, as it was later discovered, was incorrect, and Aherron was
later readmitted to the hospital in a comatose state. Aherron had actually
suffered a compound depressed skull fracture in the automobile accident.
Aherron immediately underwent emergency surgery, but suffered severe neu-
rological damage as a result of the injury.9
The Aherrons proceeded to bring a malpractice action against Dr. Taylor
and his employer, St. John's Mercy Medical Center. Prior to trial, the hos-
pital entered into a limited settlement agreement with the Aherrons whereby
the hospital was discharged from all liability.' 0 The employee, Dr. Taylor,
then moved for summary judgment on the suit against him., which the trial
court granted, based upon their finding that a valid release of the master
from all liability also acts as a release of the servant." The Missouri Court
of Appeals reversed that decision and held that the limited release that the
plaintiff entered into with the employer hospital did not operate as a release
of the employee doctor from liability for his negligence.'2
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court decision,
thereby allowing the injured plaintiff to settle with St. John's and still sue
Dr. Taylor for the remaining damages."
81 Minn. 284, 83 N.W. 1091 (1900); Hunt v. Ziegler, 271 S.W. 936 (Tex. Ct. App.
1925).
.8. Aherron v. St. Johns Mercy Medical Center, No. 48817, slip op. at 1 (Mo.
Ct. App. Aug. 6, 1985).
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id. St. John's had filed two counts against the physician Taylor. The trial
court earlier had dismissed the count for indemnification, and upon entering into the
settlement St. John's voluntarily dismissed the contribution claim against Taylor
without prejudice. Id.
11. The trial court released Dr. Taylor even though Aherron specifically re-
served a right in the release to sue Dr. Taylor for the remaining damages. Aherron,
713 S.W.2d at 499.
12. Aherron, slip op. at 2. In addition to reversing the trial court's granting
of a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Taylor on the Aherron's medical malpractice
claim, the court also reversed the dismissal of St. John's cross-claim for indemnifi-
cation against Taylor.
13. Aherron, 713 S.W.2d at 499. Treating this case as on original appeal
866 [Vol. 51
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The issue involved in this case-whether or not a release of the master
also acts as a release of the servant-is one of first impression in Missouri. 4
When an injury complained of has resulted from the servant or employee's
negligence alone (as in this case), any liability on the part of the master or
employer is based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior."s The employer's
liability is not based upon any wrongdoing of its own, but rather is vicarious
and based solely upon the employee's negligence. Therefore, it is logical that
if an employee is released from all liability for his negligence, then any claim
against the employer should also fail. 6 A release of an employee eliminates
the only ground upon which an employer might be held liable for an injury.' 7
An employee's liability for his own negligence, however, is not dependent
upon the negligence of the employer. Accordingly, there is no justification
for extending the nonliability benefit of the employer to the employee." A
federal court applying Missouri law on this issue found that a valid release
of a city (employer) from all liability for its engineer's negligence also op-
erated as a release to the city engineer.' 9 The Aherron Court, however, re-
jected that decision.20 Instead, it adopted the law and reasoning of a Delaware
court 2l which rejected the common law rule dealing with the release of a
tortfeasor after examining the reasons underlying the common law rule.
under article V, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution, the supreme court also
reversed the trial court's judgment, which in essence was an affirmation of the ap-
pellate court decision. Id.
14. Another case addressed this issue but under different facts. Cox v. City
of Freeman, 321 F.2d 887 (8th Cir. 1983). In Cox, the federal appellate court applied
Missouri law where a contractor sued the city in tort for negligently hiring an engineer
who allegedly caused delay in a construction project. The contractor entered into an
agreement of accord and satisfaction with the city. The court held that under Missouri
law a valid release of an employer from liability for tort operates to release an
employee. Id. at 893.
15. State ex rel Algiere v. Russell, 359 Mo. 800, 803, 223 S.W.2d 481, 483
(1949) (en banc).
16. Aherron, slip op. at 3.
17. Id. Under the theory of respondeat superior, the master or employer has
not committed an act for which he is independently liable, but is only liable through
the act of his servant. Therefore, when a valid release of the servant is executed, that
release extinguishes the master's liability. Id.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Cox v. City of Freeman, 321 F.2d 887 (8th Cir. 1983) (discussed supra note
14).
20. The Missouri Supreme Court in Aherron did not address this issue; how-
ever, the appellate court in Aherron stated that it was not bound by the federal
decision in Cox for two reasons: first, the factual situation was different, and second,
the state of Missouri was not bound by that federal decision. Aherron, slip op. at 3; see
Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963) (en banc). A federal court
applying what they deem to be Missouri law is not binding upon a Missouri state
court, and is to be considered only to the extent that it may shed some light upon
what the law of the state is. Id. at 52.
21. Clark v. Brooks, 377 A.2d 365 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), aff'd sub nom.
Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747 (Del. 1978).
1986]
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The common law view found that where more than one tortfeasor has
contributed to the injuries of a plaintiff, the release of one tortfeasor barred
any recovery from the other tortfeasor. 2  Because a master-servant tortfeasor
relationship at common law was deemed indistinguishable from that of a
joint tortfeasor relationship, the release rule applied to the master-servant
relationship. 23 Therefore, under the common law approach an injured plain-
tiff could not settle with or release an employer tortfeasor and still maintain
his suit for remaining damages against the employee tortfeasor. The release
of either the employer or the employee had the effect of releasing the other
even though the document did not mention such a release and the parties
did not in fact intend to accomplish that result. 24 In fact, in some cases other
tortfeasors were released from liability even where a release contained a
statement specifically reserving a right of action against them.5
The majority of courts still adhere to this common law rule that a release
of the master from all liability for a negligent act of a servant also serves
to release the servant. 26 Although this is still the law in most jurisdictions,
the case law supporting that position is relatively old, and recent decisions
affirming that view have been sparse. 27
Missouri has chosen to adopt the minority view that a release of the
employer does not act as a release of the employee. 28 The approach that
Missouri has adopted, although still a minority, appears to be the modern
trend.2 9
The appellate court in Aherron rejected the majority view because it
recognized the important distinction between a release from liability of a
22. Clark, 377 A.2d at 369 (citing Brown v. City of Cambridge, 85 Mass. (3
Allen) 474 (1862)).
23. Id. A master and servant at common law were not considered joint tort-
feasors because they could not procedurally be sued jointly, but the relationship was
considered indistinguishable from joint tortfeasors in that a satisfaction from one
still discharged both. Id.
24. See Clark, 377 A.2d at 369 (citing Annotation, Release of (or Covenant
not to sue) Master or Principal as Affecting Liability of Servant or Agent for Tort,
or Vice Versa, 92 A.L.R.2D 540, 540-45 (1963); Annotation, Release of (or Covenant
not to sue) Master or Principal as Affecting Liability of Servant or Agent for Tort,
or Vice Versa, 126 A.L.R. 1199, 1202-06 (1940)).
25. E.g., McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 374, 377-78, 185 S.E. 873, 874 (1936)
(citing Bland v. Warwickshire Corp., 160 Va. 131, 135, 168 S.E. 443, 444 (1933)).
In Bland, the injured party executed a release to one tortfeasor while expressly re-
serving rights against the other. Bland, 160 Va. at 135, 168 S.E. at 444.
26. Aherron, slip op. at 3. ("There are cases from other jurisdictions on both
sides of the issue, and the weight of authority favors the holding that release of the
master also releases the servant." (citation omitted)).
27. E.g., International Halliwell Mines v. Continental Copper & Steel Indus.,
544 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1976); Sade v. Hemstrom, 205 Kan. 514, 471 P.2d 340 (1970).
These decisions are recent affirmations of the common law rule.
28. Aherron, 713 S.W.2d at 500.
29. Compare Hartigan v. Dickson, 81 Minn. 284, 83 N.W. 1091 (1900) and
[Vol. 51
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master, and a release from liability of a servant, which the majority approach
misses.30 The appellate court based its holding upon the principle that an
employee's liability for his own negligence is not based upon the negligence
of the employer." Therefore, if an employer is released from liability for a
negligent act of an employee, the negligence of the employee is still present.
While the employer is only secondarily liable, the employee is liable for one
hundred percent of the harm caused by his negligent act.32
If the employer has paid part of a damage claim in a settlement, then
the tortfeasor employee is still liable to the plaintiff for the remainder of the
claim, and to the employer for indemnification.33 If the employee is released
however, then logically, the employer should also be released as the employee
is not entitled to any contribution or indemnification from the employer.34
The Missouri State Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, but relied
on a recently enacted Missouri statute which was held by the lower court to
be inapplicable to the Aherron case.3 5 The injury to Aherron occurred in 1978,
five years before the statute was passed in 1983.36 That fact appears to nullify
the application of the statute to Aherron due to the fact that statutes are
presumed to only operate prospectively.37
Hunt v. Ziegler, 271 S.W. 936 (Tex. Ct. App. 1925) with Biles v. Harris, 521 P.2d
884 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) and McFadden v. Turner, 159 N.J. Super 360, 388 A.2d
244 (1978). While a majority of states still have law supporting the common law rule,
most states that have recently dealt with this issue now follow the minority rule..
Aherron, slip op. at 3.
30. Aherron, slip op. at 4. The appellate court in Aherron reversed the trial
court, and rejected the common law rule based not upon a statutory ground, but rather
upon a judicial approval of the minority approach. Id. at 6-7.
31. Id. at 3.
32. Id. at 4; see also Clark v. Brooks, 377 A.2d 365, 371 (Del. Super. Ct.
1977) ("The employee's liability for his own negligence is not dependent on [the]
negligence of the employer ... "), aff'd sub nom. Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d
747 (Del. 1978).
33. See Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183, 187-88, 24 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1940).
The Losito court held that, while a tortfeasor employee will always be liable to a
settling employer for indemnification, the employer's settlement does not establish
liability against the employee in favor of the injured plaintiff. Id. The employee will
be responsible to the plaintiff for the remaining damages only if he is found liable.
Id. at 188, 24 N.E.2d at 707.
34. Clark, 377 A.2d at 371.
35. Aherron, 713 S.W.2d at 501. The applicable Missouri statute is Mo. REv.
STAT. § 537.060 (Supp. 1986). After granting transfer of this case, the Missouri
Supreme Court treated the case as on original appeal under Article V, section 10, of
the Missouri Constitution. As a result, when the supreme court also reversed the trial
court decision, in essence the supreme court was affirming the appellate court decision.
Aherron, 713 S.W.2d at 499.
36. Aherron, slip op. at 6.
37. See Aherron, 713 S.W.2d at 502 (citing Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636
S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1982) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1094 (1983)) ("It is
5
Moedritzer: Moedritzer: Equitable Release Procedure
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1986
870 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
However, it is also true that this presumption only applies to those
statutes which affect substantive rights as opposed to remedial rights.3 8 Al-
though the injury to Aherron occurred in 1978, the release was given to St.
John's several months after the 1983 Missouri statute was enacted. Therefore,
the court stated that a retrospective application of the statute in Aherron did
not affect any substantive right or create any new obligation on the part of
Dr. Taylor. 9 The Act did not affect the rights or liabilities of Dr. Taylor
because the the plaintiff could have chosen to sue only the doctor; he didn't
have to release the hospital, and in fact did so only by chance.4 When the
release was finally given after the effective date of the statute, the parties
knew or should have known of the provisions of the Uniform Act. 4' As a
result, the Missouri Supreme Court, although affirming the appellate court
decision to follow the minority rule, did so based upon statutory grounds. 42
The controlling statute is Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.060 (1983),'4 which is
Missouri's version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
(Uniform Act).44 The statute provides in part that,
generally said that a statute is presumed to operate prospectively [sic] only, unless a
contrary intent of the legislature appears.").
38. See Aherron, 713 S.W.2d at 502 (citing Clark v. Kansas City, S.L. & C.
R.R., 219 Mo. 524, 532-33, 118 S.W. 40, 43 (1909).
39. Aherron, 713 S.W.2d at 502; see also Smith v. Fenner, 399 Pa. 633, 161
A.2d 150 (1960). In Smith, a cause of action arose on June 4, 1950 against three
defendants. At the time of the accident, this jurisdiction's law was that had the
plaintiff entered into a settlement with one of the tortfeasors, the other two tortfeasors
would be released from all liability to the plaintiff. Although the Uniform Act changed
the effect of such a release, it did not change the cause of action nor did it increase
what could have been the liability of any of the tortfeasors at the time the cause of
action arose. At the time the release was executed, under the new law (Uniform Act),
none of the tortfeasors had any vested right to be released from liability. Id. at 642,
161 A.2d at 155.
40. Aherron, 713 S.W.2d at 502. The court analogized the situation to pro-
visions of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act which cover contribution
among tortfeasors which have been held not to affect substantive rights. Each tort-
feasor will be liable for the entire amount of judgment, and any reduction in liability
resulting from a settlement by one joint tortfeasor would have been "a matter of
chance rather than the result of a right which became fixed as of the time of the
accident." Augustus v. Bean, 56 Cal. 2d 270, 272, 363 P.2d 873, 875, 14 Cal. Rptr.
641, 643 (1961) (en banc); accord Village of El Portal v. City of Miami Shores, 362
So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1978).
41. See Holve v. Draper, 95 Idaho 193, -, 505 P.2d 1265, 1267 (1973); Smith
v. Fenner, 399 Pa. at 642, 161 A.2d at 155.
42. The appellate court in Aherron did not make the distinction between the
date of injury and date of release as the supreme court did. Rather the court found
the statute to be inapplicable based upon the fact that injury occurred before the
statute was passed. Aherron, slip op. at 6.
43. Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060 (Supp. 1986).
6
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When an agreement is given by release ... to one of two or more persons
liable in tort for the same injury or wrongful death, such agreement shall
not discharge any of the other tortfeasors for the damage unless the terms
of the agreement so provide; however, such agreement shall reduce the claim
by the stipulated amount of the agreement, or in the amount of the con-
sideration paid, whichever is greater-.4
The Missouri Supreme Court after determining the retrospective applicability
of this statute, held that both St. John's, a vicariously liable employer, and
Dr. Taylor, a negligent employee, are "persons liable in tort for the same
injury or wrongful death," and are therefore subject to these statutory pro-
visions controlling the release of a tortfeasor. 46 Therefore, the court held that
under this statute Aherron could release St. John's from liability and still
maintain a suit against Dr. Taylor for the remaining damages. 47
The Aherron Court relied heavily in its decision on a Delaware case,
Clark v. Brooks,48in which that state's version of the Uniform Act was
interpreted.4 9 The Delaware Court explained that prior to its adoption of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Delaware adhered to the
majority rule regarding release of a tortfeasor in an employer-employee tort
situation. 0 With the adoption of the Uniform Act, however, that court re-
44. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975)
[hereinafter U.C.A.T.A.]. Although Missouri has not officially adopted the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, its state version is very similar to the Uniform
Act. E.g., compare U.C.A.T.A., 12 U.L.A. 63, 98 (1975):
When a release ... not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good
faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or
wrongful death: (a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from
liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it
reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated
by the release . . ., or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, which-
ever is greater.
with Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.060 (1983):
When an agreement is given by release ... to one of two or more persons
liable in tort for the same injury or wrongful death, such agreement shall
not discharge any of the other tortfeasors for the damage unless the terms
shall reduce the claim by the stipulated amount of the agreement, or in the
amount of the consideration paid, whichever is greater.
45. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.060 (1983).
46. Aherron, 713 S.W.2d at 502.
47. Id. at 503. After reversing the trial court on this issue, the cause was
remanded to the trial court for reinstatement of Aherrons claim against Doctor Tay-
lor. Id.
48. 377 A.2d 365 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Blackshear v. Clark,
391 A.2d 747 (Del. 1978).
49. The statute involved was Delaware's version of the U.C.A.T.A. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6301-6308 (1975).
50. See Clark, 377 A.2d at 369 (citing Balick v. Philadelphia Dairy Prods.,
35 Del. 269, 162 A. 776 (1932)); see also Raughley v. Delaware Coach Co., 47 Del.
343, 91 A.2d 245 (1952).
7
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jected the majority rule and interpreted the Uniform Act to allow an injured
party to release an employer tortfeasor and pursue the employee tortfeasor
for the remaining damages.'
Like Missouri and Delaware, many jurisdictions have or are in the proc-
ess of adopting statutes similar to the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act which in essence rejects the majority view.12 Because of the
changes in our society and protections afforded tortfeasors by these recently
enacted statutes, the reasons underlying the establishment of the common
law rules are no longer as compelling as they once were.
The reasoning behind the common law view is threefold. One reason
behind the common law rule focused on the disparity of financial conditions
between the employer and employee. It was thought that employees could
not survive financially with the expense of paying a damages claim, and that
therefore, it was more equitable to place the burden on the employer who
had access to liability insurance. 3 Today the liability insurance situation is
much different since it has been shown that physicians are as fully equipped
as the hospitals to absorb and distribute a damages claim.54
The second major justification offered for the common law rule is that
if a plaintiff settles. with an employer for the precise injury which is the
subject matter of his action against the employee, then that settlement is
treated as a good faith election of damages to which the plaintiff must be
content." This argument is weakened by the fact that there is a distinction
between a release or settlement with the employer and a judgment against
the employer. A suit carried to judgment against the employer, which would
necessarily be for the full claim, if satisfied would be a bar to a suit against
51. Clark, 377 A.2d at 369.
52. See U.C.A.T.A., 12 U.L.A. 61 (Supp. 1986). Twenty-one states have
officially adopted the Uniform Act. Id. Other states such as Missouri have adopted
statutes so similar to U.C.A.T.A. that they have been interpreted to have the same
effect of abolishing the common law rule concerning release of a tortfeasor. E.g.,
Holve v. Draper, 95 Idaho 193, 505 P.2d 1265 (1973) (Although Idaho has not
officially adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, its state version
of the Uniform Act was held by this court to abolish the common law rule concerning
release of a tortfeasor).
53. See Mayfair Fabrics v. Henley, 101 N.J. Super. 363, 375, 244 A.2d 344,
352 (1968) (citing McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 191, 162 A.2d 820, 830
(1960)).
54. See Rutigliano, Insurance Crisis for Doctors?, 22 TRAL 28 (1986). Ac-
cording to a 1983 American Medical Association annual survey, the average physician
paid only $5,800 for his 1982 malpractice premium, while his net income was $99,500.
Id.
55. See Hartigan v. Dickson, 81 Minn. 284, 286, 83 N.W. 1091, 1092 (1900).
In this case, a written release was given by an injured employee to the employer
railroad company for which he worked. The court held that this release also operated
as a release to the negligent foreman of the railroad. Id.
872 [Vol. 51
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the employee.5 6 However, a partial settlement with the employer does not
amount to an adjudication of the entire claim. 7 Therefore, that settlement
cannot logically be used as a bar to a further suit against the servant if the
plaintiff has not been fully compensated for his injuries.
According to the defendant Dr. Taylor in Aherron, this situation is
analogous to that of a master settling with the plaintiff for the amount of
his (master's) insurance policy.58 Under this argument, if the settlement does
not cover the total amount of the plaintiff's damages, then he should not have
settled. Since he did, it is presumed that his damages in principle have been
covered, and he can no longer maintain his suit against the negligent servant
because there are no more damages to be compensated for.
This theory is supported in some jurisdictions, the analysis apparently
being that the damages for the tort are entire and not severable, and therefore
the injured party is entitled to but one satisfaction.59 It has been stated,
however, that the employee's liability for his own negligence is not dependent
upon the negligence of the employer. Accordingly, there is no justification
for extending the nonliability benefit of the employer to the employee. 60 As
long as the plaintiff is not recovering in excess of the damage amount entitled
to, he should be able to settle with the hospital for less than the full amount
of damages and still retain a cause of action against the doctor.
6
'
The third reason behind the common law rule derives from the fear of
unjust enrichment on the part of the plaintiff; the notion being that if the
plaintiff were allowed to settle with one tortfeasor and still sue another for
additional damages, he might obtain a double recovery. 62 This fear of unjust
enrichment is adequately countermanded by the statutory rule adopted by
the Aherron Court, which requires that any consideration paid for the release
56. E.g., Miller v. Beck, 108 Iowa 575, 582, 79 N.W. 344, 346 (1899); Losito
v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183, 190, 24 N.E.2d 705, 708 (1940).
57. Miller v. Beck, 108 Iowa 575, 578, 79 N.W. 344, 345 (1899); Losito v.
Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183, 190, 24 N.E.2d 705, 708 (1940).
58. Aherron, slip op. at 5.
59. See McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 374, 377, 185 S.E. 873, 874 (1936).
60. See Clark v. Brooks, 377 A.2d 365, 371 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), aff'd sub
noma. Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747 (Del. 1978). However, those jurisdictions
adopting the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act reduce the damages claim
against one tortfeasor by the amount paid for the release or the consideration paid
by the released tortfeasor, whichever is greater. U.C.A.T.A. § 4, 12 U.L.A. 63, 87
(1975).
61. Courts following this reasoning provide that any payment made by the
master or employer reduces the claim of the injured plaintiff against the employee
"pro tanto," but it cannot do more. In other words, any amount recovered from
the settlement with the employer will be subtracted from the damages amount that
the injured party will be entitled to recover in a later suit. See Losito, 136 Ohio St.
at 190, 24 N.E.2d at 708.
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be applied to reduce the plaintiff's total recovery for his injuries. 63
Although the modern trend is now fueled by a statutory rejection of the
common law rule, this trend began when a few courts responded judicially
to the inequity of the common law rule. A few courts at common law were
reluctant to apply the release principle applicable to joint tortfeasors to the
employer-employee relationship.64 The view that a release of a master or
employer does not release a servant or an employee was first taken in Losito
v. Kruse,65 and then later adopted in Hamm v. Thompson.6 The main jus-
tification centered on the fact that in many states, at that time, there was
no contribution among joint tortfeasors. 67 Therefore, to adopt a rule that
an employer and employee are to be considered joint tortfeasors to the extent
that a release of the master acts as a release of the servant would operate
as a grave injustice. By doing so, the released employee wrongdoer would
be let off the hook. He Would no longer be liable to the injured party as a
result of the release, and would not be responsible to the employer due to
the prohibition against contribution."
These early cases rejected the common law rule based not upon any
statutory authority, but rather upon a judicial disdain for the inequitable
result of the common law rule. It is true, however, that the majority of cases
decided in the absence of a specific statute still support the view that a valid
63. Aherron, 713 S.W.2d at 501. The statute provides that a release by an injured
plaintiff to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury "shall
reduce the claim by the stipulated amount of the agreement, or in the amount of
consideration paid, whichever is greater." Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.060 (Supp. 1986).
64. Granquist v. Crystal Springs Lumber Co., 190 Miss. 572, 577, 1 So. 2d
216, 218 (1941) (held that common law rule prohibiting contribution between joint
tortfeasors did not apply to parties whose liability is based upon respondeat superior).
Although the Granquist court considers the liability between master and servant to
be joint and recognizes that they may be joined in one action, they are not joint
tortfeasors. Id.
65. 136 Ohio St. 183, 24 N.E.2d 705 (1940). Losito involved an action by plaintiff
Losito against Kruse and Kruse's employer for injuries sustained by Losito while riding
in an automobile driven by defendant Kruse. Losito entered into a written settlement
agreement with Kruse's employer while expressly reserving rights against Kruse. The
court held that a partial settlement with the employer cannot act as a bar to a further
suit against the employee except as to reduce damages. Id. at 190, 24 N.E.2d at 708.
66. 143 Colo. 298, 353 P.2d 73 (1960). Hamm involved an action for damages
sustained when a car driven by defendant Hamm collided with a car driven by
plaintiff, Thompson. The court held that the employer of defendant Hamm was liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior for negligence of his employee, but that a
release of the employer did not constitute a release of its employee. Id. at 305, 353
P.2d at 76.
67. E.g., id. at 301, 353 P.2d at 75 ("[Tlhere is no contribution among
conventional tortfeasors in this jurisdiction.").
68. Id.
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release of one of the parties to the master-servant relationship releases the
other .69
Perhaps the major problem with this common law approach is that it
fails to take into account the intent of the written release. Instead the ap-
proach emphasizes the existence of only one wrongful act for which there
can be only one satisfaction and by doing so may effect a release of a
tortfeasor when no such result was intended.70 Anticipating this inequity,
many jurisdictions are enacting statutes in this area which focus on the intent
of the parties involved in executing this type of release. 7' Those jurisdictions
dismiss the common law fiction that an injured party is entitled to a solitary
satisfaction, whether it be for the full amount of damages or not.72
There are four types of statutes which have been held to govern the
question of whether or not a release of one of the parties in the master-
servant relationship releases the other from liability for a tort committed by
the servant. One type of statute provides that a release of one joint tortfeasor
shall release all others unless clear intent to do otherwise is shown. 73 The
next type of statute looks solely to the release to ascertain the intent of the
parties.74 The next category comprises statutes which provide that a plaintiff
may release one tortfeasor without impairing his rights against the others.7 1
The fourth recognized type of statute, which includes the Uniform Contri-
bution Among Tortfeasors Act, provides that the release of one joint tort-
feasor shall not release the others unless an expression of contrary intention
69. E.g., Magidson v. Bloom, 170 Misc. 832, 11 N.Y.S.2d 324 (City Ct. 1939);
Hunt v. Ziegler, 271 S.W. 936 (Tex. Ct. App. 1925); McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va.
374, 185 S.E. 873 (1936).
70. E.g., McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 374, 377-78, 185 S.E. 873, 874 (1936)
(citing Bland v. Warwickshire Corp., 160 Va. 131, 135, 168 S.E. 443, 444 (1933)).
In Bland, the court completely disregarded the intent of the party executing the release
to one tortfeasor even though the injured party expressly reserved rights against the
other tortfeasor. 160 Va. at 135, 168 S.E. at 444.
71. E.g., U.C.A.T.A. § 4, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975). A release "does not discharge
any of the other tortfeasors from liability for injury. . ., unless its terms so provide."
Id. Although the various state contribution statutes discern the parties intent in a
written release in different manners, emphasis is still placed to some degree on whether
a plaintiff intended to release other tortfeasors from liability.
72. The common law approach allowed an injured plaintiff only one satis-
faction for his damages; therefore, once a release was. given to one tortfeasor, all
others were released regardless of the plaintiff's intent involved in executing a written
release. This "one satisfaction rule" even went so far as to deny a plaintiff's claim
against one tortfeasor even though an express reservation of rights as to that tortfeasor
had been included in a written release. See McLaughlin, 166 Va. at 377-78, 185 S.E.
at 874 (citing Bland v. Warwickshire Corp., 160 Va. 131, 135, 168 S.E. 443, 444
(1933)).
73. E.g., LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2203 (West 1952).
74. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-109 (1975).
75. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 55-7-12 (1981).
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can be found in the release.7 6 This relatively recent shift to consideration of
the parties' intent involved in executing a release derives from the problems
associated with allowing just one satisfaction per injury, whether it be for
the full claim or not. This "one satisfaction rule" not only discourages
settlements, but also promotes injustice in that it protects the remaining
tortfeasors, and may prevent the injured party from recovering his full dam-
ages.77
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act has facilitated the
declining acceptance of the old common law rule pertaining to the release
of a tortfeasor. Most cases which have interpreted the state versions of the
Uniform Act in the employer-employee context have abolished the harsh
majority rule which barred an injured party from releasing one and suing
the other.78 However, certain jurisdictions are in dispute as to whether or
not the employer-employee situation is covered under the Uniform Contri-
bution Among Tortfeasors Act.7 9 The dispute concerns a reference to joint
tortfeasors contained in the 1939 version of the Uniform Act.80 It is recog-
nized generally that a master and servant are not considered to be joint
tortfeasors because the liability of the master is solely derivative."' "The
common law denied contribution among tortfeasors based upon the theory
that wrongdoers did not deserve the assistance of the courts in achieving
equal or proportionate distribution of a common burden. ' 82 In 1939 the
76. U.C.A.T.A. § 4, 12 U.L.A. 63, 87 (1975).
77. The "one satisfaction rule" protects remaining tortfeasors to the extent
of the difference between the plaintiff's total damages and the amount received by
the plaintiff from the settling tortfeasor. Although the employee tortfeasor will be
liable to the settling employer tortfeasor for indemnity, the employee tortfeasor will
be released from any liability to plaintiff for remaining damages.
78. E.g., Mazer v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1963); Clark v. Brooks,
377 A.2d 365, 372 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Blackshear v. Clark, 391
A.2d 747 (Del. 1978); Holve v. Draper, 95 Idaho 193, 505 P.2d 1265 (1973); Smith
v. Raparot, 101 R.I. 565, 225 A.2d 666 (1967).
79. Compare Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747 (Del. 1978) (held U.C.A.T.A.
was applicable to situation where employer-hospital and employee-physician were
severally liable for same injury) and Smith v. Raparot, 101 R.I. 565, 225 A.2d 666
(1967) (applying an act of the same wording as in Clark, this court held that the
employer-employee relationship was within the definition of joint tortfeasor as used
in the act) with Craven v. Lawson, 534 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tenn. 1976) (provision of
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act that a release or covenant not to sue
one tortfeasor does not discharge any other tortfeasor would have no application to
master-servant or employer-employee relationship in which liability was solely deriv-
ative).
80. U.C.A.T.A., 12 U.L.A. 57 (1975).
81. An employer and employee are not considered joint tortfeasors because
no right of contribution exists between them, as it does in joint tortfeasor relation-
ships. The liability of the employer is vicarious, in that it is based solely upon the
negligence of the employee, as opposed to joint tortfeasors where liability of each
tortfeasor is actual.
82. See Craven, 534 S.W.2d at 656.
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commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the first Uniform Act
providing for contribution among joint tortfeasors.83 The 1939 Act and its
release provisions were made applicable only to joint tortfeasors, whose def-
inition appeared to exclude employer-employee tortfeasors 4 With a view
towards reconciling this and other serious problems that existed within the
Uniform Act, the commissioners in 1955 promulgated a revised version of
the Uniform Act.8" The 1955 revised Uniform Act deleted the term joint
tortfeasors and replaced it with "two or more persons liable in tort for the
same injury. ' 86 The decisions which have interpreted that 1955 revised version
of the Uniform Act in similar state contribution statutes are almost unani-
mous in holding that this definition includes the employer-employee situa-
tion. 87 The reason for this interpretation is that an employer and employee,
while not jointly liable in terms of contribution, are severally liable in tort
for the same injury. Thus, the basis of liability (joint or vicarious) is irrel-
evant; it is only the fact that an employer and employee are severally liable
that causes the relationship to come under the Uniform Act. 8
In addition, although it is true that when a tort is committed by an
employee, the employer and employee are not considered joint tortfeasors
in terms of liability, the relationship is considered indistinguishable from that
of joint tortfeasors in a release context.8 9 This means that under the common
83. Id.; see U.C.A.T.A. § 1, 12 U.L.A. 57 (1975).
84. The 1939 version of the U.C.A.T.A. defined joint tortfeasors as "two or
more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or
property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them."
U.C.A.T.A. § 1, 12 U.L.A. 57 (1975).
85. Craven, 534 S.W.2d at 656 (citing U.C.A.T.A., 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975)).
86. U.C.A.T.A. § 4, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975). Missouri's original state contri-
bution statute contained a reference to "two or more joint tortfeasors or wrong-
doers." Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.060 (1953) (amended 1983). That was similarly amended
in 1983 to parallel the Uniform Act's reference to tortfeasors and it reads "two or
more persons liable in tort for same injury." Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.060 (Supp. 1986).
87. E.g., Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747, 748 (Del. 1978); Smith v. Ra-
parot, 101 R.I. 565, 567, 225 A.2d 666, 667 (1967); see also Holve v. Draper, 95
Idaho 193, 505 P.2d 1265 (1973). In Holve, the court considered this issue in light
of the fact that the Idaho legislature had adopted the 1939 version of U.C.A.T.A.,
but not the 1955 version of the Uniform Act. The case is noteworthy because even
though the Act adopted by Idaho ('39 Uniform Act) was the old Uniform Act, which
seemed to require joint liability, the court found that the definition of joint tortfeasor
included employer-employee tortfeasor situations. Id.
88. Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747, 748 (Del. 1978).
89. Clark v. Brooks, 377 A.2d 365, 369 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), aff'd sub
noma. Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747 (Del. 1978). The common law considered
the master-servant relationship and common law joint tortfeasor relationship to be
indistinguishable, not upon any consideration of liability to the injured party, but
upon a desire to prevent unjust enrichment on the part of the injured plaintiff.
Therefore, whether the liability of the tortfeasors was joint or otherwise was incon-
sequential. See Brown v. City of Cambridge, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 474 (1862).
1986] 877
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law rule, it was inconsequential as to the effect of that release on the other
tortfeasors whether the other party was a joint tortfeasor or an employee.
That release operated as a release to the other tortfeasor, regardless of whether
liability was joint or otherwise.9 The failure on the part of the common law
to distinguish between the master-servant relationship and joint tortfeasors
in a release context lends credence to the belief that modern joint tortfeasor
rules should apply to the master-servant relationship; hence the applicability
of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act to the master-servant
tortfeasor relationship.9'
A second dispute involving the Uniform Act concerns the fact that when
a tort is committed by an employee, although both the employee and em-
ployer will be liable for damages, only the employer has a right to indem-
nification. 9 Where the right to indemnity exists between tortfeasors, no right
of contribution exists. 93 The proposition has been advanced that where no
right of contribution exists, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act does not apply.9 4 Most courts have rejected that argument, because
although the Uniform Act deals primarily with contribution, it expressly
recognizes tort situations where indemnity is available. 9
In spite of the modern trend, a number of jurisdictions have adhered
to the majority rule pertaining to release of a tortfeasor and are divided on
the issue of why they have done so. Some courts have reasoned that a partial
90. The minority view takes the opposite approach that a release of a tort-
feasor from all liability does not always release other tortfeasors from liability, re-
gardless of whether the liability is joint or otherwise. If an employee-tortfeasor is
released from liability, then the minority view follows the majority approach, and
extends that release from liability to the employer-tortfeasor. However, the minority
view does distinguish between joint and vicarious liability in a release when an em-
ployer tortfeasor is released from liability for the negligence of an employee. Under
the minority approach, the release from liability would not be extended to the em-
ployee tortfeasor as the majority approach would do. Clark, 377 A.2d at 371.
91. Id. at 370.
92. F. MECHEM, LAW ON AGENCY § 1293-4, at 937-38 (1914); 42 C.J.S. In-
demnity § 21, at 597-98 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsTrrUTION § 96, at 418-
21 (1937).
93. Craven v. Lawson, 534 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tenn. 1976).
94. Clark, 377 A.2d at 371. The defendant in this case argued that appor-
tionment of damage liability was one-directional, in that the employer is entitled to
indemnification, while the employee is not. Therefore, the defendant claimed that
title 10, section 6304 of the Delaware Code (Delaware's Uniform Act) was inapplicable
to the case, because both tortfeasors were not entitled to contribution. Id.
95. U.C.A.T.A. § 1(f) commissioner's note, 12 U.L.A. 63, 67 (1965). But see
Craven, 534 S.W.2d at 656 (the court accepted this argument in rejecting applicability
of U.C.A.T.A. to an employer-employee tort situtation). "Where no right of con-
tribution exists, the Act does not purport to intrude. Thus the section providing that
a covenant not to sue discharges the covenantee from contribution and does not
discharge any other tortfeasor, has no application to the master-servant relationship,
where liability is solely derivative." Id.
[Vol. 51
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release and an acceptance of satisfaction of judgment are in principle the
same and have a similar effect. 96 That effect is that the release operates to
extinguish the cause of action against other tortfeasors, even if the injured
plaintiff has reserved the right to sue other tortfeasors. Some jurisdictions
claim that it is impermissible to apportion the damages among those re-
sponsible by releasing one party and then showing that one party was liable
and the other not.97 The most recent cases advocating the old rule do look
more to the intent of the release, but, in the absence of a specific statute,
adhere to the majority rule that a valid release of one tortfeasor to the master-
servant relationship releases the other.98
Many reasons have been suggested for abandoning the common law rule.
Some courts use an intent/full satisfaction test wherein an action against the
servant is not denied unless the injured plaintiff intended to release the other
tortfeasor, and the settlement was intended to be in full satisfaction of the
claim.99 Other cases have held that the consequences of the release of a master
or servant vis-a-vis the other are no different than the release of one actual
joint tortfeasor vis-a-vis another, and therefore find no release if that is the
intent of the parties.100
Other cases hold that a tortfeasor threatened with a lawsuit has the right
to buy his peace. This settlement, however, operates as a release only to the
party affected, and if the damages claimed have not been fully satisfied, the
plaintiff may sue the other tortfeasor for the remaining amount. 02
These courts recognize what the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfea-
sors Act is attempting to change about the majority rule on this issue. The
primary concern in these situations is that an injured party receive whatever
sum he is entitled to. The propriety of the Uniform Act and these cases is
that they are designed to protect the injured party rather than the wrongdoer.
This is done without any prejudice against the wrongdoer because the plaintiff
is entitled to one full satisfaction and no more. Of course, if the plaintiff
receives full satisfaction from one tortfeasor, the others will be released. 0
The approach that the Aherron Court adopted is much more logical and
equitable than the common law rule. Although it is still the minority rule,
other courts are likely to approve of this approach in the future. The de-
96. See McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 374, 381, 185 S.E. 873, 875 (1936).
97. Hartigan v. Dickson, 81 Minn. 284, 286, 83 N.W. 1091, 1092 (1900).
98. See Simpson v. Townsley, 283 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1960); Sade v. Hemstrom,
205 Kan. 514, 471 P.2d 340 (1970) (citing Jacobson v. Woerner, 149 Kan. 598, 89 P.2d
24 (1939)).
99. Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958); McFadden v. Turner,
159 N.J. Super. 360, 388 A.2d 244 (1978).
100. Biles v. Harris, 521 P.2d 884 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (settlement and release
with employer).
101. Losito v. Kruse, 136 Ohio St. 183, 188, 24 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1940).
102. Breen, 28 N.J. at 362-63, 146 A.2d at 670.
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parture from the common law rule of releases was originally formulated in
the context of concurrent acts of negligence, where each tortfeasor was ac-
tually liable, rather than being vicariously liable. 103 It is logical however, that
this departure from the common law rule be extended to the employer-
employee tortfeasor relationship. Although both tortfeasors are not actually
liable, each is independently liable to the injured plaintiff.'04 Therefore, the
rationale behind this departure from the common law rule "is equally ap-
posite whether the liability is actual or vicarious - namely, that plaintiff is
entitled to pursue all those who are independently liable to him for his harm
until one full satisfaction is obtained."' 0 5
The Aherron decision is also important because the Missouri Supreme
Court recognized that its adopted view that a release to one tortfeasor does
not discharge other tortfeasors until full satisfaction has been made, while
still a minority, is better reasoned than the majority view. This trend has
been fueled by a recent acknowledgement that the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act is applicable to employer-employee situations. The
trend also has the effect of encouraging settlements, which is a welcome
contribution to the law. Finally, the Aherron decision is significant in that
it directs the parties towards an equitable solution. The injured plaintiff is
assured of a satisfaction that is proportionate to the damages to which he
or she is entitled. Therefore, a plaintiff's cause of action against each and
every party liable in tort for the damages is not unjustly restricted.
MARK MOEDRITZER
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